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Abstract
In recent years philosophers of science have explored categorical equivalence as a promising
criterion for when two (physical) theories are equivalent. On the one hand, philosophers
have presented several examples of theories whose relationships seem to be clarified using
these categorical methods. On the other hand, philosophers and logicians have studied
the relationships, particularly in the first order case, between categorical equivalence and
other notions of equivalence of theories, including definitional equivalence and generalized
definitional (aka Morita) equivalence. In this article, I will express some skepticism about
categorical equivalence as a criterion of physical equivalence, both on technical grounds and
conceptual ones. I will argue that “category structure” (alone) likely does not capture the
structure of a theory, and discuss some recent work in light of this claim.
1. Introduction
In (Weatherall, 2016a), I proposed a criterion of equivalence for (physical) theories.1 This
criterion states that two theories are equivalent if:
1. their categories of models are equivalent;2 and
2. the functors realizing that equivalence preserve empirical content.
Email address: weatherj@uci.edu (James Owen Weatherall)
1This proposal was inspired and strongly influenced by Halvorson (2012), who had previously argued
that category theory would likely be useful for representing theories, particularly for settling questions of
(in)equivalence, but who did not make a concrete proposal for how to do this in practice. Since then,
there has been a large literature on this subject in philosophy of physics. (Of course, mathematicians have
long used category theory to explore related issues!) For a detailed review of the literature on theoretical
equivalence in physics, see Weatherall (2018b).
2I do not review basic ideas from category theory in any detail here; for background, see Mac Lane
(1998), van Oosten (2002), or Leinster (2014).
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A “category of models”, here, is a category whose objects are models of a physical theory,
and whose arrows are maps that, in a suitable sense, preserve the structure of those models.3
What is meant by “empirical content”, meanwhile, is contextual and difficult to pin down
in general; in cases of interest one can make precise the sense in which it is preserved. I
will have much to say about this criterion below, but in the first instance the idea behind
it is that two theories are equivalent if (a) their mathematical structures are equivalent,
qua mathematics; (b) they are empirically equivalent; and (c) these two equivalences are
compatible. The first of these, (a), is captured by the equivalence of categories; the (b)
and (c) are captured by the requirement that it be precisely those functors that realize the
categorical equivalence that also preserve empirical content.
As I describe in section 2, this criterion of equivalence, which (at risk of ambiguity) I will
call categorical equivalence of physical theories, has been fruitfully employed in a number of
cases to clarify the senses in which candidate pairs of theories are equivalent or inequivalent.
I think it has led to correct verdicts in all of these cases, and that at least in some cases it
has done so in a way that provides new insight into the theories in question. But despite
these successes, I think there are reasons to be cautious about the adequacy of categorical
equivalence as a criterion of theoretical equivalence.4 In particular, I will argue, a category
of models does not (necessarily) capture the (mathematical) “structure” of a theory. Thus,
the (categorical) equivalence of two categories of models does not (necessarily) preserve
3In many physical theories, there are natural candidates for the “models of the theory”; the arrows
require more careful attention, though in practice, ambiguities concerning what one should take as arrows of
the category of models reflect real interpretational differences. For instance, the models of general relativity
are relativistic spacetimes, which are four-dimensional manifolds, satisfying certain topological conditions,
endowed with a smooth metric of Lorentz signature. One natural choice of arrows for this category are the
isometries, which are diffeomorphisms between spacetime manifolds that preserve the metric.
4One might be skeptical that there is any single criterion—that is, any necessary or sufficient conditions—
for equivalence of theories; instead, one might think that there are many criteria out there that each capture
different senses of equivalence, and that the most fruitful approach is to develop a bestiary of such criteria
and to ask, in particular cases, in which senses theories are and are not equivalent. From this perspective,
the worry is that categorical equivalence, as described in the literature, may not adequately capture the
sense of equivalence that it is intended to capture—or, perhaps, any interesting sense at all.
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the structure of a theory.5 Categorical equivalence is plausibly a necessary condition for
equivalence, but it is not sufficient.
The worries I will express are related to, and partially inspired by, considerations pre-
viously raised by Barrett and Halvorson (2016) and Hudetz (2018). But the perspective
I offer is different. In particular, I will start with what I take to be the successes of the
categorical equivalence approach, and then question whether these successes are achieved
for the adverted reasons.
The remainder of the paper will proceed as follows. I will begin by introducing categor-
ical equivalence in more detail, and then reviewing some of the ways in which categorical
equivalence has been studied and applied by philosophers of science. I will then present
some critiques of the approach—including several that I think are important to record, but
which I will not pursue (or respond to) here. Next I will focus in on one particular worry,
regarding whether a category can be said to represent the structure of a theory. I will
present what I call the ‘G’ property, which is a property that a category may (or may not)
have, and the failure of which in particular examples seems to capture a sense in which
those theories do not adequately capture the structure we care about. I will ultimately
argue that the ‘G’ property is neither necessary nor sufficient for a category to capture this
structure, but I will suggest that it points in a fruitful direction. In the final section, I will
describe three attitudes one might adopt given the arguments I present, and argue that they
suggest different—though not necessarily mutually exclusive—research programs that one
might pursue.
5Note, here, that the ambiguity alluded to above matters: at issue is whether the categorical equivalence of
two categories of models adequately captures the required relationship between the mathematical structures
invoked in physical theory; if not, then categorical equivalence, as a criterion of theoretical equivalence that
includes an additional condition regarding empirical significance, arguably fails.
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2. Categorically Equivalent Theories
Categorical equivalence has been explored by philosophers from two directions.6 One, largely
theoretical approach—pursued, for instance, by Barrett and Halvorson (2016) and Hudetz
(2018)—has focused on properties of categories of models of theories in first or higher order
logic. This approach has established that, in the first order case, categorical equivalence is
strictly weaker than other compelling notions of equivalence, such as definitional equivalence
and so-called “Morita”, or generalized definitional, equivalence.7 Insofar as these other
notions of equivalence, which seem natural within a logical context, are well-motivated, one
might take this result alone to show that categorical equivalence is too weak.
But this conclusion may be too fast, because it is not clear “how much” weaker categor-
ical equivalence is. In particular, Barrett and Halvorson (2016) conjecture that categorical
equivalence is equivalent to Morita equivalence (in the sense of yielding the same verdicts)
for certain classes of first order theories,8 and they suggest that since categorical equivalence
is much easier to apply in cases of real physical theories, where one often does not have a
first order formulation. For just this reason, we do not have examples of (physical) theories
that are categorically equivalent but inequivalent in some stronger, logical sense, of a sort
that we might want if we were to evaluate what is missing from categorical equivalence.
This remark brings us to the second direction from which categorical equivalence has been
studied by philosophers. What we do have is a growing handful of physical theories that are
6 A third direction—pursued, for instance, by Nguyen (2017) and by Butterfield (2019)—has been more
critical. These authors argue that there are further considerations, related to the interpretation of theories,
that are necessary to establish equivalence. (See also Coffey (2014) and Sklar (1982).) In a sense, this
is uncontroversial: after all, categorical equivalence, as described above, requires theories to be empirically
equivalent, in a way that is compatible with their categorical equivalence, and empirical equivalence depends
on interpretation. But there is still a matter of controversy over whether there are further senses in which
interpretation should matter. I set this cluster of issues aside in what follows, as my goal is to raise a
different set of concerns about categorical equivalence.
7Generalized definitional equivalence of physical theories has been studied extensively by Andre´ka and
Ne´meti (2014); see also Andre´ka and Ne´meti (2014) and Lefever and Sze´kely (2018).
8Specifically, they conjecture that categorical equivalence implies Morita equivalence for theories with
finite signatures.
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either categorically equivalent, or else which fail to be categorically equivalent in ways that
help us to better understand their relationship.9 In particular, categorical equivalence has
been used to argue for the equivalence of several pairs of theories: electromagnetism formu-
lated in terms of vector potentials and in terms of electromagnetic fields are equivalent if
and only if one takes vector potentials related by a gauge transformation to be isomorphic
(Weatherall, 2016a,d); likewise, Newtonian gravitation and geometrized Newtonian gravita-
tion (Newton-Cartan theory) are equivalent if and only if one takes gravitational potentials
related by a certain class of transformations to be isomorphic (Weatherall, 2016a); Einstein
algebras and general relativity are equivalent (Rosenstock et al., 2015); Lagrangian mechan-
ics and Hamiltonian mechanics are equivalent on one way of conceiving of each theory, but
one can motivate other ways of thinking of these theories on which they are not equivalent
Barrett (2017); and likewise there are various formulations of Yang-Mills theory that are
equivalent and inequivalent (Weatherall, 2016d; Rosenstock and Weatherall, 2016; Nguyen
et al., 2018; Bradley and Weatherall, 2020).
The details of these examples do not matter for what follows. The point is that the
application of categorical equivalence to these cases of antecedent interest has been fruitful.
For one, I believe that categorical equivalence has given the right verdict in all of these cases:
the theories that are categorically equivalent are equivalent, in the most salient senses; and
the theories that are not categorically equivalent are not equivalent—and more, the ways
in which they fail to be categorically equivalent have provided insight into the theories in
question. In particular, in the cases where one establishes inequivalence, one can still identify
functors that relate the relevant theories’ categories of models, and which do so in a way
that preserves empirical equivalence. Studying the properties of such functors can reveal
information about the theories. For instance, if one does not take vector potentials related
9See Weatherall (2017) for a more detailed discussion of the ways in which categorical equivalence has
been applied to better understand classical field theories.
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by gauge transformations to be isomorphic to one another, then there is a precise sense in
which vector potentials have more structure than electromagnetic fields.
Of course, the idea that vector potentials have “excess structure”, as compared with
electromagnetic fields, is not surprising; indeed, it is best seen as a litmus test for whether
the approach is plausible.10 But in other cases, the results have been more novel. For
instance, there is a certain theme in the philosophy of physics literature according to which
to be a realist about the standard formulation of general relativity is to endorse some form
of substantivalism.11 The reason is that general relativity is standard formulated as a theory
of fields on a four-dimensional manifold of spacetime “points”; some authors have concluded
that this means general relativity posits spacetime as an independent entity, ontologically
prior to matter. In contrast, Earman (1986, 1989) has suggested that Einstein algebras
are an appropriate formal setting for a form of relationism about spacetime in general
relativity. Briefly, an Einstein algebra is an algebraic structure whose elements represent
possible configurations of fields (Geroch, 1972). Beginning with such a structure, one can
proceed to define the structures one uses in general relativity: a metric, a derivative operator,
and so on; and one can express Einstein’s equation. But one does so without ever introducing
a manifold, and so one might think that this is a theory that does not posit, as a primitive
entity, a spacetime manifold. Instead, one works only with possible configurations of matter,
relations between those configurations, and structures one can define on the algebra of such
configurations.
But, drawing on results due to Nestruev (2003), Rosenstock et al. (2015) show that
these two theories are categorically equivalent.12 This result shows more clearly how one
10Though whether the sense of excess structure just alluded to is the right one to consider is disputed—see
Nguyen et al. (2018), and Bradley and Weatherall (2020) for a response.
11This idea is present throughout much of the literature on the hole argument (Earman and Norton, 1987;
Norton, 2011); see Brighouse (Forthcoming) for a particularly clear statement of the view, and Weatherall
(2018a) for a discussion of its origins.
12There were hints in the philosophical literature that something like this should hold. In the first instance,
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can think of a relativistic spacetime as a means of encoding, or representing, nothing more
or less than the possible ways in which matter may be (spatio-temporally) configured and
the relations between those possible configurations, precisely as Einstein algebras do. This,
I think, substantially clarifies the structure represented by a relativistic spacetime.
In other cases, exploring functors between physical theories has provided new insight into
otherwise murky philosophical disputes. For instance, in a series of recent papers addressing
the relationship between Lagrangian mechanics and Hamiltonian mechanics, North (2009)
has argued that these theories are inequivalent and that Hamiltonian mechanics has “less
structure” than Lagrangian mechanics; Curiel (2013) has argued that they are inequiva-
lent because Langrangian mechanics has “less structure” than Hamiltonian mechanics; and
Barrett (2014) has argued that the structures North and Curiel focus on are actually incom-
parable, in a certain precise sense. More recently, Barrett (2017) has substantially clarified
the situation, by showing that there is a precise sense in which Lagrangian and Hamiltonian
mechanics are (categorically) equivalent, if one takes Lagrangian mechanics to be a the-
ory in which one defines a Lagrangian on the tangent bundle of a configuration space, and
Hamiltonian mechanics to be a theory in which one defines a Hamiltonian on the cotangent
bundle of a configuration space.
But Barrett also argues that there are other, well-motivated ways of understanding these
theories—one of which he identifies with North, and one of which he identifies with Curiel.
He then shows that, if one follows North’s proposal, there is a sense, after all, in which
the theories are inequivalent. And likewise, if one follows Curiel’s proposal, the theories
are also inequivalent. And so one sees that the dispute comes down to what one should
Earman (1986, 1989) suggested that Einstein algebras might resolve the apparent indeterminism in general
relativity revealed by the hole argument (Earman and Norton, 1987). But as Rynasiewicz (1992) argued,
in related cases in algebraic topology the sorts of maps that are used to run the hole argument also arise
between algebras of functions, suggesting that it is hopeless to expect the hole argument to go away if one
moves to Einstein algebras. (See also Bain (2003).) This relationship between the maps between Einstein
algebras and relativistic spacetimes is at the heart of the equivalence result. For a different view of the hole
argument, compatible with the attitudes adopted in the present paper, see Weatherall (2016c).
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mean by “Hamiltonian mechanics” and “Lagrangian mechanics”. Of course, these technical
results do not resolve this background issue. But they help to isolate precisely where the
disagreements lie.
I take these results and the arguments based on them to be good reason to take categorical
equivalence seriously. More, since I think that categorical equivalence has yielded the correct
verdicts in each of these cases, and done so in a precise way, I think that any critique of
categorical equivalence needs to account for why using categorical equivalence has been
fruitful in these ways. But I also think that categorical equivalence is probably not the
correct criterion of equivalence, for reasons I will elaborate in the next several sections.
3. Interlude: Concerns I will not Pursue
The present section lies largely outside the main thread of the paper and can be freely
skipped. But since the goal of the paper is to question the adequacy of categorical equiv-
alence, I will now note a number of concerns about the criterion that I think are largely
distinct from the concern I focus on in the following sections. I think these, too, are issues
that will need to be addressed in any successful future development of the proposal.13 I will
not pursue these in any detail; I do not think they are dispositive, but I will not try to refute
them.
The first concern has to do with the heterogeneity of the examples noted in the previous
section. In particular, these examples involve subtly different conceptions of what counts as
a “model” of a physical theory—that is, what one takes to be the objects in a “category of
models”. This is so even though in virtually all the cases discussed above, the mathematical
13I do not take the list here to be exhaustive! For instance, I do not (otherwise) raise any concerns about
using groupoids—categories where every arrow is invertible—as opposed to categories with richer arrow
structure, to represent theories. I also note that Barth (2018) has also criticized categorical equivalence—or
rather, what he has called the solution-category approach—along lines that are related to some of the points
below, though I do not reproduce all of his concerns here and I think some of my concerns are different.
Still, my thinking has certainly been influenced by his.
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structures under consideration are of a similar character: they tend to be smooth manifolds
endowed with some further structure, often represented by fields. But the manifolds in the
different cases have different representational significance. This would not be a problem were
one concerned only with equivalence of theories in a purely logical or mathematical context,
where one might take a general view of models as structures that realize some axioms. But
in the context of scientific theories, it becomes troubling. This is because it suggests a lack of
clarity about what sorts of structures are the relevant ones to count as models for a scientific
“theory” in the wild. Given a theory, as described in a textbook or review article, say, how
is one to decide how to identify the relevant models to construct the required category?
For instance, in the examples of (a) general relativity and Einstein algebras, (b) New-
tonian gravitation and geometrized Newtonian gravitation, and (c) vector potential and
electromagnetic field formulations of electromagnetic theory, the models of the theories in
question are structures representing the complete history of the universe. In all of these
cases, except for Einstein algebras, one considers a manifold of (all) events in space and
time on which various fields are defined; in the Einstein algebra case there is no manifold,
but one has algebras of global, in space and time, field configurations.
But in other cases this is not what one does. For instance, in the example of Lagrangian
and Hamiltonian mechanics—which should not be dismissed as an outlier, since as I argued
above, it is an example in which we have learned something about the relevant theories—
the models of the theories are taken to be structures representing all possible instantaneous
states of a system, along with a particular dynamics governing the evolution of that system:
in the case of Lagrangian mechanics, this is a configuration space along with a Lagrangian
function; whereas in Hamiltonian mechanics, it is a phase space along with a Hamiltonian
function. A complete history of a system—the models of the first class of examples—would
be a trajectory through one of these spaces, rather than the space itself; conversely, in the
first class of examples one does not consider different possible dynamics, but only different
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solutions for a single dynamics.
Other examples are different, still. Consider the case of Yang-Mills theory, for instance.
On a fiber bundle formulation of the theory, the models are taken to be principal bundles
over a manifold of events, with a metric on the base manifold and a principal connection
on the principal bundle. And so in a sense there are two manifolds: one representing the
global evolution of the universe in space and time, and another carrying information about
possible configurations of matter at each point, but without picking out any particular such
configuration.14 One might also consider still other candidates that would be natural in
theories that have not been studied with these methods. For instance, one might take
a candidate “model” of quantum theory to be a Hilbert space along with a ∗ algebra of
operators acting on that Hilbert space; in this case, the model would represent a state space
along with a privileged set of observables.
But this last observation raises another issue, which also speaks to the lack of clarity
regarding what is meant by “models” here. Despite the heterogenity just noted, there is
also a striking homogeneity in the examples discussed in the last section—and those studied
with these methods. In particular, they are all examples from classical physics, and except
for Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics, they are all “classical field theories”. But this
is surely a small subset of the physical theories that may be equivalent to others! Where
are the examples from quantum mechanics, quantum field theory, statistical physics, and
elsewhere? The question is particularly striking given that some of the classic examples of
“(in)equivalent theories in the wild” are from the history of quantum theory, such as the
famous example of Schro¨dinger’s wave mechanics and Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics. Can
categorical equivalence capture the sense in which these theories are equivalent? Arguably
the reason no one has done so yet turns on precisely the ambiguity noted already concerning
14How different really is this situation from the structure one considers in general relativity? It would take
us too far afield to evaluate this question in detail, though Weatherall (2016b) argues that the structures
are much more similar in character than they initially appear.
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what should count as a model of a theory. It is not perfectly clear what the category of
models of wave mechanics or matrix mechanics ought to be.
Yet another cause for concern, largely orthogonal to the issues already raised, is that the
sense in which philosophers use category theory to represent physical theories for the pur-
poses of establishing equivalence and inequivalence seems pretty different from the “native”
applications of categories in physics, such as in the contexts of locally covariant (quantum)
field theory (Brunetti et al., 2003) or (higher) gauge theory (Baez and Schreiber, 2007). In
these cases, one tends to use category theory to express the models of the theory, not (in
the first instance) to relate those models. So it seems that category theory is entering at a
different level of analysis.15
The final two concerns are more general in character, and have less to do with the
particular examples that have been studied. First, recall that the criterion of equivalence
given above requires not only categorical equivalence, but equivalence given by functors that
“preserve empirical content”. The idea is that two theories must be, at least, empirically
equivalent if they are to be “theoretically” equivalent. But the notions of “empirical content”
and “empirical equivalence” are not clear, and it is hard to see how they could be made
precise.16 Indeed, one might worry that it is a prior, largely unanalyzed, notion of which
theories are empirically equivalent that is doing the work in the examples discussed above,
15On the other hand, once one has used categories to build models of a theory, it is often natural to
construct categories of such models. But when one does so for theories whose constructions are “native” to
category theory one tends to get much richer structures.
16An anonymous referee notes that attempts to make “empirical equivalence” precise exist in the
literature—as, for instance, in van Fraassen (1980). Fair enough. But as van Fraassen himself would
surely acknowledge, especially given his more recent work, how our scientific theories come to represent
worldly situations involves a great deal of interpretation, intention, practice, and context (van Fraassen,
2008). One can develop formal tools for expressing these intentions, etc., at which point precise standards
of equivalence may be employed. But this hardly yields a formal test of empirical equivalence analogous to
the way in which definitional equivalence, say, is a formal test of equivalence first order theories. The worry,
which I articulate presently, is that the vast bulk of the work of establishing equivalence occurs when one
tries to take the messy details of how a scientific theory is used to represent the world and distill them into
the formal apparatus—and not when one checks the properties of a certain functor.
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and that the category theoretic analysis adds little to this.17 (I return to this point in section
6.)
Worse, one might worry that one cannot establish “empirical equivalence” once and
for all: one can, at best, establish it for some class of possible interactions or possible
measurements. Indeed, in the case of the two formulations of electromagnetism discussed
in the previous section, it is natural to take the empirical predictions of each theory to
be captured by the measurements one could make with (classical) charged matter. From
this perspective, the two theories are empirically equivalent, insofar as they predict the
same motions of charged matter. But if one includes interactions with matter represented
quantum mechanically, this equivalence breaks down, as shown by the Aharanov-Bohm
effect, which is a measurable effect on the behavior of a particle propagating in a region
of vanishing electromagnetic field but non-vanishing vector potential.18 This suggests that
any equivalence one establishes is, at best, provisional, since future developments elsewhere
in physics could lead to experiments that could discriminate between allegedly “equivalent”
theories. At the other extreme, one could also imagine forcing equivalence by artificially
restricting the possible measurements under consideration.
Finally, and most generally of all: one might be skeptical about the idea of having a single,
once and for all, characterization of a physical theory—be it as a category, a set of sentences
in some language, or even a textbook account.19 The idea is that physical theories are
17This concern is implicitly raised by Norton (2008), who argues that whenever two theories are empirically
equivalent, it follows that they must share so much common structure that they are best conceived as
notational variants. Though see Bradley (2018) for a reply.
18The significance of this example for our understanding of classical electromagnetic theory is discussed
by Belot (1998).
19Note that this concern is a bit different from that raised by the authors noted in footnote 6, because
it is not specifically about formal representations of a theory. Rather, the concern is that theories are not
to be pinned down at all, whether formally or not. Indeed, one might take the remarks here to be a kind
of skepticism about any account of the “structure of theories” or even the “semantics of theories”. For an
interesting discussion of these issues, see (Formica and Friend, 2020), who argue that physical theories should
be associated with a network of different formal axiomatic theories, rather than a single theory. Thank you
to Hajnal Andre´ka and Istvan Ne´meti for drawing my attention to this work.
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messy affairs including all sorts of arguments, intuitions, biases, interpretations, intentions,
numerical methods, and so on. Worse, they are dynamic: methods develop and improve,
arguments once found persuasive are rebutted, strongly held intuitions are abandoned, and
so on. General relativity as conceived today—insofar as there is an univocal thing that goes
by that name—is radically different from general relativity as understood by Einstein and
his collaborators. But given this ever-changing richness, in what sense could one ever hope
to identify a single category associated with a physical theory, much less establish that,
because of some relation that a category stands in to another category, that two theories
are “the same”?
4. Category Structure and Ideology
As I indicated above, I will not pursue the concerns described in the previous section.
Instead, I will focus on a worry that I think is more central to the program. Put briefly:
a “category (of models)” does not (necessarily) capture the “structure” of a theory. Or in
other words, there is more to the mathematical structure of a theory than just the “category
structure” of its models.
To say what I mean by this, I first need to say what I mean by “category structure”.
Here I adopt a certain ideological posture, which is that the structure of a mathematical
“gadget” of a given kind is to be sharply distinguished from the procedure by which you
came to construct that object.20 For instance, one may think of the group Z2 as the quotient
20The term “gadget”, here, comes from John Baez, who introduced it (in conversation) because “object”
has a technical meaning in category theory and “structure” seems to carry too much baggage; basically, a
mathematical “gadget” is any sort of thing that mathematicians define and study. I adopt and discuss this
ideology in Weatherall (2016c); I think it is particularly clearly expressed in Burgess (2015), though he does
not go on to emphasize the relationship to “structure-preserving maps” that I introduce presently. Although
the basic point is very closely related to famous arguments by Benacerraf (1965), it is important to distinguish
the ideology about mathematical gadgets that I am adopting from what is sometimes called “mathematical
structuralism”. Structuralism, as I understand it, is a view about the ontology of mathematical objects. I
do not mean to make any particular claims about ontology here, and I take the claims I make here to be
compatible with many different philosophies of mathematics.
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group of the integers by even integers, as the symmetry group of a set with two elements,
or as the sphere group S0, i.e., the group of real numbers of unit length. One might also
think of it as some set of ordered sets, the first of which is a domain, and the rest of which
characterize multiplication, the identity element, and so on. All of these different ways of
constructing Z2, however, are the same in one respect: they all have, or instantiate, the
same group structure. They are the same, as groups. I take this to mean that, insofar
as one wishes to use (just) the group Z2 for some representational purpose (as opposed
to using some other mathematical gadget, perhaps with more or different structure), the
construction procedure cannot matter to the success of the representation or the validity of
inferences drawn from it. In other words, one is using Z2 for some representational purposes
only insofar as one does not use features of an instantiation of Z2 that are not shared by all
instantiations.
But how are we to isolate, from a particular realization of some gadget—say, Z2—
precisely what structure is intended? The key is to study the maps that preserve that
structure. Of course, we do not get such maps for free. But I take it that an essential part
of mathematical practice is to define, whenever a new mathematical structure is proposed,
a class of mappings that preserve the intended structure—that is, generally, but not always,
the isomorphisms of the structure. It is these mappings that capture the sense in which
the different realizations of Z2 are “the same”: they are all related by group isomorphisms.
And by looking at what these mappings preserve, one can say what the structures are. For
instance, group homomorphisms are mappings between groups that preserve group multipli-
cation; one can infer from this that groups are collections of elements that are distinguished
from one another (only) by their multiplicative relations with other group elements. In the
case of Z2, this means: Z2 has exactly two distinct elements, one of which is the identity
and the other of which, when multiplied by itself, yields the identity. What these elements
are, or which element realizes which properties, is not part of the structure, as this is not
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preserved by group isomorphism.
From this perspective, we can now return to category structure. Here the maps that
preserve (all) categorical structure are precisely the categorical equivalences.21 Hence, by
reflecting on what is preserved by categorical equivalence, we learn what category struc-
ture is. In analogy to groups, we find: a category is a collection of objects distinguished
(only, and only up to isomorphism) by their arrow-algebraic relations with other objects.
In other words, we find that the arrows carry all the information; objects are essentially
placeholders.22
In particular, this means that the “internal structure” of objects is not (automatically)
preserved under categorical equivalence. Indeed, there is a classic concern along these lines,
expressed by Hudetz (2018) and others, that categorical equivalence may “trivialize” in
some cases. Consider some well-understood, concrete category—say, the category whose
objects are groups and whose arrows are homomorphisms.23 Now consider a category whose
objects are giraffes, but whose arrows are chosen so that there exists an equivalence between
the category of groups and the category of giraffes (with specially chosen arrows). By
construction, these are equivalent. But groups and giraffes are not the same! Does this not
immediately imply that categorical equivalence is too weak a notion of equivalence?
Perhaps. Indeed, from a certain point of view, this claim should not be surprising,
21Why not the categorical isomorphisms—that is, the invertible functors? One certainly could take these
to be the relevant standard of equivalence, but this is rarely done in category theory. One reason is that
categorical isomorphisms preserve “too much”, in the sense that the intended structure of a category does not
include a determinate number of objects (only a determinate number of non-isomorphic objects). Another,
related, reason is that it is often natural to think of functors as themselves having structure-preserving
maps, known as natural isomorphisms, between them. Categorical equivalences are functors that have
“almost” inverses—that is, inverses up to natural isomorphism. In this sense, categorical equivalence might
be understood as isomorphic up to isomorphism.
22These remarks are not meant to be surprising, particularly to anyone who is accustomed to working
with categories. In fact, category theorists often emphasize that it is the arrows that do all the work, and
there are even single-sort axiomatizations of category theory in which only arrows appear.
23I am not worrying, here, about size considerations. But for someone who is worried about whether
the category of groups is well-defined, we can consider all groups of cardinality less than some inaccessible
cardinal, κ.
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for reasons discussed at the beginning of section 2: even in the first order case, categorical
equivalence is weaker than Morita equivalence, and so if one thought that Morita equivalence
was the “right” notion of equivalence for first order theories, one should conclude that
categories do not capture the structure of theories. One response to this sitation, proposed
by Hudetz (2018), is to strengthen the notion of “categorical equivalence”, by adding further
constraints on the functors that realize the equivalence. In particular, Hudetz suggests that
these functors should be definable, in the sense that if the functor takes an object of one
category to an object of another, then the object of the codomain category (or an isomorph
thereof) should be definable in terms of the object of the domain category.24 I will return to
this proposal in Sec. 6. But for now, let me simply remark that this proposal is inconsistent
with the ideology described above, at least if we understand theories to be represented by
categories, precisely because it invokes the internal structure of objects.
But there is another possible response to this concern, which is to deny that the triv-
ialization concern is real. The idea is that, at least in some cases, category structure can
represent the structure of a theory, precisely because the internal structure of the objects of
the category is suitably reflected, or encoded, in the arrows of the category. If this is right,
then the claim that the objects of a category are “giraffes” is immaterial—just as claiming
that some realization of the group Z2 happens to have, as elements, giraffes, who have a
certain multiplication relation defined on them.25 To see how this goes, consider an example:
the category of sets, Set, whose objects are sets and whose arrows are functions. (Of course,
by the above, that the objects are sets is immaterial—I am simply giving a construction.26.)
24Hudetz makes this condition precise, but for present purposes an informal description suffices.
25There is a connection here to classic work by Makkai (1993), on a duality between syntax and semantic
in first order theories; see also Awodey and Forssell (2013); Lurie (2018). At least in some cases, one can
reconstruct a theory, uniquely up to a suitable notion of equivalence, from its category of models. But the
relationship between such results and the categories encountered in the philosophy of physics literature is
not clear.
26In fact, the category of sets can be defined “directly”, as the category satisfying certain axioms, as
opposed to by beginning with a prior definition of sets and functions. See Lawvere (1964)
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It turns out that in this case, using only arrow constructions, we can reason about sets in
detail. For example, there is an object in this category, unique up to isomorphism, that has
the property that there exists a unique arrow from any other object to this object. Call this
object 1. (It happens to be a set with one element.) Then arrows from 1 may be thought of
as elements of their codomains. Similarly, we may think of monomorphisms (i.e., injective
functions) as subsets, constructions known as coproducts are disjoint unions, and so on. All
of this is true irrespective of what we happen to say the internal structures of the objects
are like.
This example seems to show that the trivialization concern is chimerical: much more is
(or can be) encoded in the arrows of a category than is immediately apparent. But is this
always the case? As I argue in the next section the answer appears to be “no”—including
for cases of interest for the categorical equivalence program in philosophy of science.
5. The ‘G’ property
In the previous section, I argued that in the category Set, the internal structure is “external-
ized”, i.e., that the internal structure of sets is reflected in the arrows of the category. One
way of understanding how this works is to note that objects of the category are uniquely
distinguished, up to isomorphism (bijection), by their positions in the graph of arrows. For
instance, two sets are isomorphic if and only if they have isomorphic automorphism groups.
This feature of Set suggests a proposal. Perhaps one should say that a theory is captured
by category structure only if the arrows of that category can distinguish the objects, up to
isomorphism.
More precisely, we define the following property that a category may have.27
27I call this the ‘G’ property because it was proposed by Bob Geroch during a conversation with Hans
Halvorson at a meeting in Pittsburgh in April, 2013. Essentially the same condition was also discussed,
apparently independently, by Dewar and Eva (2017), though their motivation for considering the condition
was different: they suggested that violating it would indicate that a theory has “excess structure”. I do not
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Definition 1. A category C has the ‘G’ property if every full, faithful, and essentially
surjective functor F : C → C is naturally isomorphic to 1C.
In other words, a category has the ‘G’ property if every “autoequivalence”, that is, every
symmetry of the category, in the sense of an equivalence of the category with itself, is
naturally isomorphic to the identity.28 Spelling this out, it means that any way of mapping
objects of a category to objects of a category that preserves the network of arrows will
necessarily take objects to isomorphic objects. In this sense, then, the condition captures
the idea that objects are distinguished, up to isomorphism, by their place in the network of
arrows.
The category Set has the ‘G’ property. So do other “concrete” categories that one often
encounters, such as the category Group of groups and group homomorphisms (Freyd, 1964,
p. 31). But it is also easy to identify simple categories for which it fails: consider, for
instance, a category with two objects and two arrows (the identity on each object). There is
an autoequivalence that swaps the ojects, but the objects are not isomorphic (and indeed,
there are no arrows between them). Still, such examples are contrived, and it is hard to see
what internal structure is being captured (or not) in such a case. And so one might ask: do
categories that we might naturally associate with, say, physical theories always have the ‘G’
property?
The answer is “no”. Consider, for instance, general relativity. We might define a category
of models of GR as follows: it is a category whose objects are relativistic spacetimes—
that is, smooth, Hausdorff, paracompact four dimensional manifolds with smooth Lorentz-
signature metrics—and whose arrows are isometries—that is, diffeomorphisms that preserve
engage further with their proposal here. It is also considered by mathematicians, under a different name:
the ‘G’ property is precisely the condition that the automorphism class group of a category be trivial (cf.
Freyd, 1964, Problem 1.B). (I am grateful to Hans Halvorson for bringing Freyd’s work to my attention back
in 2013.)
28Here we make use of the fact that every full, faithful, and essentially surjective functor as an almost-
inverse, i.e., is an equivalence of categories. For definitions of full, faithful, and essentially surjective, see
Leinster (2014).
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the metric. (This is the category associated with GR by, for instance, Rosenstock et al.
(2015).29) This category does not have the ‘G’ property. The reason is that many relativistic
spacetimes have no non-trivial symmetries at all—and since the only arrows of the category
are isomorphisms, these objects are not distinguished from one another. Choose any two,
non-isometric, spacetimes, each with only one automorphism, and consider a functor from
GR to itself that takes the first spacetime (and any spacetime isometric to it) to the second;
takes the second (and any spacetime isometric to it) to the first; and acts as the identity
on everything else. (There is only one action on arrows that makes this mapping into a
functor.) The functor so described is an equivalence—but by construction it is not naturally
isomorphic to the identity functor.30
So the ‘G’ property does not hold of all categories of interest—and, conversely, the
category GR does not have the resources to distinguish non-isometric spacetimes. (Indeed,
reflection on the argument just given suggests that GR encodes very little about the generic
spacetimes.) This seems to me to be a serious problem for the categorical equivalence
program. The reason is that the equivalence of categories of models is supposed to capture
the sense in which two theories are, mathematically, equivalent. But there is far more to
even the mathematical structure of relativistic spacetimes than is encoded in the category
GR.
Still, the situation is not perfectly clear. There are reasons to think that the ‘G’ property
is neither necessary nor sufficient for a category to capture the “structure” of a theory. This
29Below I discuss concerns about whether this category has the “right” arrows. But one might also object
that it is not clear what objects the category should have, on the grounds that it is not clear if we should
limit attention to spacetimes that are connected, maximal, etc. (Manchak, 2020). I set this issue aside here,
but note that the two questions may interact in interesting ways.
30One might worry that this argument depends essentially on GR being a groupoid—i.e., that it has
no non-invertible maps. This means that there is no information about which spacetimes might be, for
instance, embeddable in one another. Perhaps by adding more arrows, such as isometric embeddings, one
could produce a category that has the ‘G’ property. But I doubt it, because one could then consider
spacetimes that were, roughly speaking, asymmetric at all scales. This would generate more complicated
structures, but still no automorphisms. I suspect that a similar functor could be generated under these
circumstances, though I do not claim that this is a proof.
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property may seem to capture what makes Set seem suitably externalized, but it is not
quite what we want. GR may well be deficient, but the ‘G’ property does not capture why.
To see that the ‘G’ property is not sufficient, consider the following two theories, with
associated categories. First, we have the theory “Directions”. Directions says “the cardinal
directions form a two dimensional vector space (over the reals), with ‘north’ and ‘east’
physically distinguished”. Its category of models, Di, has, as objects, two dimensional
vector spaces with (preferred) ordered basis, and as arrows, linear bijections that preserve
that (ordered) basis. Now consider the theory “Baubles”. Baubles says “there are two shiny
things, one of which is red and the other of which is blue”. Its category of models, Bau,
has, as objects, ordered pairs (of distinct elements), and as arrows, bijections that preserve
order.
One can easily see that both Bau and Di have the ‘G’ property. This is because,
in both cases, all models of the theories are (uniquely) isomorphic to one another, which
means that any autoequivalence of the categories of models will necessarily take objects
to isomorphic objects. But it is hard to see how either captures the structure of their
respective theories. Indeed, Di and Bau are equivalent, despite the models having very
different internal structures: the objects of Di are two dimensional vector spaces, which
have infinitely many elements; whereas the objects of Bau have only two elements. But
the arrows of the categories do not reflect this.31 So the ‘G’ property does not seem to be
sufficient for a category to have suitably captured the internal structure of its objects.
The Bau-Di example may seem contrived—and if so, one might think that there is
some other property that it fails to have but which, in conjunction with the ‘G’ property,
would capture the desired features.32 On this view, one might expect the ‘G’ property to
31This sort of situation arises often when one has highly structured (or highly asymmetric) objects in a
category. There are very few maps available that preserve all of the relevant structure.
32There is another response available to the Bau-Di example, which is to say: in fact, the internal
structure of the objects in these categories is not so different after all. This response is motivated by the
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be necessary, but not sufficient. But there are reasons to think this fails as well, as can be
seen from the following, non-contrived example.
Consider the category Ring whose objects are rings and whose arrows are ring homomor-
phisms. Rings, recall, are Abelian groups endowed with a second operation—multiplication,
as opposed to the group operation, which is called “addition” in this context—that is asso-
ciative and distributive over addition.33 In general, ring multiplication is not commutative,
so that the order of multiplication matters. It turns out, though, that although the order
of multiplication matters, there is a certain sense in which the order is nonetheless a mat-
ter of convention. To make this observation precise, note that given any ring R, one can
always construct an opposite ring, Rop, which has precisely the same elements, but whose
multiplication operation is such that for any A,B ∈ R, A×R B = B ×Rop A. Thus, we see
that there is a certain intuitive sense in which the “same” multiplication relations may be
captured using ×R or ×Rop—namely, by reading left to right versus right to left.
One is tempted to say that the ring R and the ring Rop have “the same” ring structure.
After all, they have the same elements, and, in a sense, the same multiplicative relations,
simply expressed in a different way. But in fact, a ring and its opposite are not, in general,
isomorphic, and so whatever the intuitive sense in which rings and their opposites “have the
same ring structure” may be, it is not captured by isomorphism.34
idea that (adopting the terminology of Winnie (1986)) the objects of these categories are “co-determinate”,
in the sense that any two dimensional vector space, with ordered basis, is determined “freely” by that basis,
i.e., by an ordered pair; and every two dimensional vector space with ordered basis determines, in particular,
an ordered pair (consisting of the basis elements). So, perhaps, once we choose an ordered basis for a vector
space, the entire vector space structure should be seen as “determined by” (or, roughly, definable from) that
basis. From this perspective, that property ‘G’ holds of these categories is not a problem for property ‘G’.
But alas, this response is too fast. The reason is that these categories are too rigid, and one can easily come
up with other categories, equivalent to both, for which this “co-determination” relationship does not seem
to hold. Consider, for instance, the category whose objects are sets with one elements and whose arrows
are functions preserving that element. (Or: the category 1, with a single object and a single arrow.) This
category is equivalent to both Bau and Di! And yet it is hard to see how a set with one element could
determine a two dimensional vector space in any interesting sense (since the free vector space on one element
is one dimensional). I am grateful to Thomas Barrett for pushing me on this point.
33Rings are also generally taken to have a multiplicative identity.
34In fact, although many examples of rings that are not isomorphic to their opposites are known, they are
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Instead, this relationship is captured by an autoequivalence of the category Ring. The
transformation that takes rings to their opposites, and acts in the obvious way on arrows,
determines a functor Op :Ring→Ring that takes rings to their opposite rings. This functor
is full, faithful, and essentially surjective, and thus it is an autoequivalence (actually, it is
an automorphism) of the category. But since rings are not isomorphic to their opposites, it
immediately follows that the functor Op is not naturally isomorphic to the identity, because
it takes objects to objects that are not isomorphic. Thus, the category Ring does not have
the ‘G’ property.
One response to this example would be to concede that the category Ring does not
adequately capture the structure of rings. But I think this is too fast. As I suggested above,
the functor Op seems to take rings to other rings that are, in some sense, “the same”, but
where that sense of sameness is not captured by isomorphism. In other words, one might
think of this autoequivalence as reflecting a real “symmetry” of the theory of rings.35 Far
from failing to capture the structure of rings with the arrows of the category, the Op functor
shows that the network of arrows captures a non-trivial sense in which non-isomorphic rings
can nonetheless be the same. Of course, this is not a proof of anything, because I have not
provided a definitive argument that Ring does capture the structure of the theory of rings.
The argument is merely suggestive that the ‘G’ property is not necessary. But whatever
else is the case, the failure of the ‘G’ property in this case has a very different character
from that in GR, and it is much less obvious, in light of the Ring example, that the ‘G’
property is really capturing what is wrong with the category GR, as a representation of
not exactly trivial to state. See Jacobson (1951, §2.8) or Lam (2013, §1). I believe it was Hans Halvorson
who first brought this example to my attention. Observe that groups, too, have opposites, defined in a
similar way, but in general groups are isomorphic to their opposites, where the isomorphism takes group
elements to their inverses.
35Some readers might be tempted, in light of this, to revise the notion of “isomorphism” associated with
rings, so that all rings that are suitably “the same” are isomorphic. But this strikes me as a disastrous
proposal. A ring homomorphism that could not distinguish left multiplication from right multiplication
would wash out the structure of non-commutative rings!
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general relativity.
Stepping back from this discussion, one might reasonably ask: if the ‘G’ property is
neither necessary nor sufficient for a category to have the features that we are interested
in, then who cares? I think the considerations just raised show that the ‘G’ property is not
quite what we want. But this does not change the fact that some categories, such as Set,
Group, and even Ring, seem to have some feature that GR appears to lack, regarding the
way in which the network of arrows reflects or expresses the structure of the objects. And
this leads to a number of questions: Is there a property that better captures the intuition
that motivated the ‘G’ property? Do all “natural” “concrete” categories (such as Man)
share these features? Does any physical theory’s category of models have this property?
6. Where do we go from here?
In the paper thus far, I have proposed a certain informal sense in which some categories might
be said to adequately represent the structure of a theory, and argued that the categories
one encounters in many discussions of categorical equivalence in the philosophy of science
literature do not seem to have the necessary features. I have also proposed a formal condition
intended to make the reasoning just sketched precise, but I have argued that this condition
cannot be what we want. This leads to a rather unsatisfactory situation: it seems that there
is a sense in which the criterion of categorical equivalence, as discussed in the philosophical
literature, is inadequate as a criterion of theoretical equivalence; and yet, it is not clear how
the criterion should be modified, nor even how to precisely express how it fails.
In the present section, I will sketch three ways of responding to this situation. Some
philosophers have already begun exploring each of these three options. But it seems to me
that these options reflect importantly different conceptions of what it means to associate a
category with a theory. Thus, I think that the merits of each need to be carefully weighed
in future work on this subject.
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The first possible way forward would be to pursue the program suggested by section 5:
we could find a ‘G’-like property that distinguishes Set from GR in a salient way, but which
also respects the sort of symmetry exhibited by Ring. We would then say that categorical
equivalence yields theoretical equivalence only for theories whose associated categories satisfy
the ‘G’-like property. The main advantage of this approach is that it would capture what
makes Set distinctive, and it would help directly diagnose the problem with GR. In a sense,
it is the brute-force solution to the problem.
On the other hand, this approach has a number of unattractive features. Perhaps the
most immediate is simply this: what could the property be? One reason to be skeptical that
any such property exists is that the idea the property is meant to express—that a category
adequately represents the structure of a theory—is not obviously an intrinsic property of a
category at all. Instead, the feature we wish to capture concerns a relation that we wish to
see between a category and a theory. We want to know not just about the category itself,
but whether it has certain capacities relative to some theory or other. Of course, this is just
a rough implausibility argument; it could well turn out that, precisely because categories
with certain properties do capture the structure of some theory, their capacity to do so is
manifest, as it were, internally.
But let us suppose this strategy were successful, in the sense that some property could
be found. There are still reasons to doubt that it is the right way forward for the program.
First, we already have good reason to expect that this approach would limit the applicability
of categorical equivalence, since the example of GR already suggests that categories that we
might be interested in using to represent physical theories are unlikely to have the requisite
property. Indeed, it is not clear that we should expect any physical theory, encountered in
the wild, to naturally be associated with a category satisfying the sort of property envisaged
by this program.
If this is right, then it would suggest that some or all of the theories for which categorical
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equivalence has already been used would no longer count as categorically (or theoretically)
equivalent. Fair enough, one might say: that is progress in our understanding of the re-
lationship between these theories. But if this is right, then the apparent successes of the
categorical equivalence program become a mystery: as I noted above, it seems to me that
categorical equivalence has given the correct verdicts in the cases to which it has been ap-
plied. If categorical equivalence, as a criterion, is restricted only to theories whose categories
have a certain property, and none of the theories considered thus far have that property, then
we need to start from scratch in understanding in what sense the theories are equivalent.
So much for the first option, which seems to me to fail even if it succeeds.36 This leads
to a second option, which would be to change the criterion of equivalence not by limiting
attention to categories with certain properties, but by restricting attention to functors with
certain properties. In particular, this is the sort of proposal that Hudetz (2018) has defended:
recall that on Hudetz’s proposal, one should require that two theories are equivalent just
in case they are categorically equivalent, where the functor realizing that equivalence is
definable.37 This leads to a criterion of equivalence that Hudetz calls definable categorical
equivalence.
This approach has some virtues. From this point of view, the problems described in
previous sections arise not so much because some categories fail to capture the structure
of theories, but rather because we compare those categories using a poorly behaved crite-
rion.38 One might then conjecture that if we limited attention only to definable functors,
36That said: there remains an interesting question raised by this first approach, which is: if categories C
and D are equivalent, with F : C → D realizing that equivalence, then what, if any, structural relationship
holds between objects c in C and F (c) in D? I am grateful to Thomas Barrett for emphasizing this point,
which I completely endorse.
37In a recent talk, Thomas Barrett described a similar, but distinct, program, on which it is “well-behaved”
functors that realize equivalences. I will not attempt to reconstruct (or scoop) his ideas here, but note only
that it is another proposal that falls into this second category—or, perhaps, somewhere in between the first
and second approaches, depending on how it is spelled out.
38One might be tempted by a possible resonance with the previous proposal, and try to modify the ‘G’
property, using the notion of definable functor, as follows: a category satisfies the ‘H’ property if every full,
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the “problematic” examples of functors that realized (auto)equivalences in examples such
as GR would go away, and we would be left only with examples such as Ring, where the
failure of the ‘G’ property did not seem to rule out the possibility that the category captured
the internal structure of the objects of the category.
But attractive as this proposal may seem, we should be careful about what, exactly, it
amounts to. Recall the ideology above: I argued that to understand the “structure” of a
mathematical gadget, we must study the maps that we take to preserve that structure. In
general, by changing the “structure preserving” maps we consider, we are implicitly changing
the structures preserved by those maps. And this is precisely what we are doing when we
move from functors to definable functors as maps between categories.
Presumably something like this can be done, but we need to be careful and explicit. In
particular, no one has clearly articulated what sorts of mathematical gadgets are related
by definable functors.39 And this is a concern not only for conceptual reasons, but also
for technical ones. For a functor F : C → D to be definable, certain properties must
hold concerning languages associated with the objects of C and D. But a generic category
does not have a language associated with its objects.40 So in general, how can we evaluate
whether a functor is definable? The situation is strongly analogous to noting that not
all functions between sets are well-behaved, and then restricting attention to continuous
or smooth functions—without first defining a notion of “topological space” or “manifold”.
To properly define a notion of definable functor, we first need to introduce a new kind of
structure, a Hudetz category, where Hudetz category structure is whatever is preserved by
faithful, and essentially surjective definable functor F : C → C is naturally isomorphic to 1C . But this
proposal is unlikely to work, since the functor Op :Ring→Ring apparently counts as definable.
39I do not mean to criticize Hudetz here. He is explicit about the assumptions he is making when he
defines definable functors, and makes clear why in the cases of interest, definable functors are well-defined.
But I read his assumptions as sufficient conditions for making sense of definable functors, which is weaker
than a theory of the sorts of structures that definable functors relate.
40Observe that for some categories—toposes—there is an “internal language” associated with the category.
But this notion of internal language is not the same as the notion of “language of objects of a category”
associated with definable functors.
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definable functors.
These remarks are not meant to dismiss the proposal. To the contrary, I think it is a
fruitful one to pursue. But the remarks do suggest that the proposal is incomplete, and they
raise questions about how much help the definable functor program will be. In particular, as
I have argued above, theories in the wild can, arguably, be associated with categories. But
it is much less clear that they can be associated with Hudetz categories, since whatever else
is the case, it seems Hudetz categories will require one to specify a (possibly higher order)
language associated with a physical theory, and it is not clear that there is a canonical
choice of such a language.41 But suppose that this problem can be surmounted. Then, even
if suppose we can associate a Hudetz category with any physical theory in a natural way,
it seems the work will be done in identifying and justifying the choice of a language and
establishing the necessary definability properties, which raises the concern that category
theory plays little role.
On the other hand, it is possible that although the proposal is still incomplete, it is
unproblematic, for independent reasons. Consider, again, the following analogy: suppose
a “definable functor” is a bit like a “continuous function”. Of course, we need a topology
to make sense of continuous functions. But some spaces, such as R, come equipped with
a canonical topology, or a unique topology compatible with other structure. And some
functions of interest on R, such as polynomials, are all automatically continuous in that
topology. One might hope or expect that, although we have not yet defined the structure
analogous to “topology” on categories of interest, once we do so we will find that there was
a unique or canonical choice, and that the functors that seemed to be the ones of interest
will automatically count as “definable” or otherwise well-behaved. Indeed, it might be that
we want to generate our definitions so that this turns out to be the case. This possibility
strikes me as the most optimistic for the program, though its status remains unclear.
41Hudetz has recently made some progress in this direction: see, for instance, (Hudetz, 2019).
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Finally, I will now turn to the third option for a path forward. To begin, consider
again the examples of “successes” mentioned above—Einstein algebras and general relativ-
ity; Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics; and so on. Investigating the proofs of cat-
egorical equivalence in each of these cases, we find that the crucial step relies on some
background, often deep, mathematical fact. For instance, the relationship between vec-
tor potential and electromagnetic field formulations of electromagnetism ultimately comes
down to Poincare´’s lemma. The relationship between “standard” and geometrized New-
tonian gravitation ultimately depends on Trautman’s theorems. The relationship between
Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics depends on the Legendre transformation, and that
between Einstein algebras and general relativity is s special case of function-space duality.
And so on.
But if it is really these relationships that are in the background, what is added by
proving that there is a categorical equivalence (or inequivalence)? The answer is that, in
establishing a categorical equivalence, we show that these relationships are functorial, and
then determine whether those functors are full, faithful, and essentially surjective. In other
words, one attempts to show that the mappings on objects determined by the relationships
in question take every model of each theory to an essentially unique model of the other
theory; and that it does so in such a way that every structure-preserving map between
the models of one theory correspond uniquely to a structure-preserving map between the
corresponding models of the other theory, and vice versa. These are natural things to (try
to) establish about any mathematical relationship, and establishing whether they hold in a
particular case can underwrite a claim that a given relationship really does capture a sense
in which two theories are equivalent.
Abstracting, then, from this discussion, one might say that what we are really doing when
we establish that physical theories are categorically equivalent is abstracting “pure category”
structure from a richer characterization of theories, and using that category structure to pro-
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vide a heuristic for evaluating relationships of prior interest. (I call this idea “Rosenstock’s
heuristic”, because I think this perspective is adopted in much of Sarita Rosenstock’s work
on categorical equivalence (Rosenstock, 2018).)
One way of thinking about this proposal would be to say that categorical equivalence
is necessary for equivalence of theories, but that it may not be sufficient. Sufficiency,
meanwhile, requires a more subtle and contextual analysis of the proposed relationships
between theories—one that, in practice, often involves establishing that the relationships
under consideration are already known to preserve “empirical content” in some substantive,
but context-dependent, way. In other words, much of the work is done by showing that
there are alternative formulations of a theory that are, in some suitable sense, empirically
equivalent; establishing that the relationship realizing that empirical equivalence is also a
categorical equivalence, then, provides a still stronger sense in which the theories should
be said to be equivalent.42 And if the functor is not an equivalence, then one can use the
heuristic to better understand what is “lost” as one moves from one formulation to the
other.43
From this perspective, the examples of GR and Ring have little bearing on the equiv-
alence relationships under consideration: categorical equivalence is, in a sense, secondary—
something we seek to establish only after determining that two theories are empirically
equivalent. The fact that there exist apparently pathological autoequivalences of GR is
irrelevant because those autoequivalences are pathological precisely because they do not
42Compare this perspective to classic arguments due to Sklar (1982), recently amplified by, for instance,
Coffey (2014), Nguyen (2017), and Butterfield (2019), to the effect that a “purely formal” criterion of equiv-
alence could never be adequate. (Recall note 6.) Here it is a semantic relationship—that is, a relationship
between the interpreted, applied theories—that is ultimately the starting point, and then the formal meth-
ods are a guide to evaluating such relationships. Consider, too, a connection to (Norton, 2008), which argues
that empirically equivalent theories are more or less certain to be equivalent in some stronger sense, or else
to differ in ways that make more clearly preferable; from the present perspective, categorical (in)equivalence
is a way of establishing how much, if anything, is missing from some empirical equivalence.
43On this point, see the discussions in Baez et al. (2004), Weatherall (2016d), Nguyen et al. (2018), and
Bradley and Weatherall (2020).
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preserve empirical content. They simply do not realize the sort of relationships that we are
interested in. And whether there are autoequivalences of Ring is of interest only if it turns
out that Ring is associated with some physical theory, and those autoequivalences preserves
empirical content. Without that, they, too, are irrelevant. Similarly, understanding cate-
gorical equivalence in terms of the Rosenstock heuristic explains why the “successes” noted
above were, in fact, successes: they were all cases in which there existed a salient relationship
between theories, the status of which was clarified by recasting it in categorical terms.
Still, there are disadvantages to adopting this perspective that are important to recog-
nize. Perhaps the most significant disadvantage is that on this view, much (but not all) of the
work in establishing that two theories are theoretically equivalent falls back on the murky
question of whether those theories are empirically equivalent, which arguably makes the
criterion of equivalence vaguer than it at first appears. (On the other hand, insofar as em-
pirical equivalence is necessary for theoretical equivalence, all of the approaches discussed in
this section face this worry.) A related concern is that, on the other approaches discussed,
categorical equivalence is meant to capture some precise sense in which the mathemati-
cal structures used by two theories are equivalent, qua mathematical structures; empirical
equivalence, then, establishes merely that in addition to being equivalent qua mathematics,
the structures are used in compatible ways for representational purposes. On the present
perspective, this relationship is reversed. The claim that categorical equivalence, or some
modification thereof, should be expected to capture some robust notion of mathematical
equivalence is dispensed with, which makes the significance of categorical equivalence more
obscure.
This last set of remarks point a significant difference between the Rosenstock heuristic
and both the ‘G’ property and Hudetz category approaches. On the first two approaches, a
category of models, satisfying some further properties or endowed with some further struc-
ture, is intended to capture or represent a theory, full stop. Implicit, I think, in these
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approaches is the idea that a theory—or at least, a mathematical theory, though perhaps
also a physical theory—is the sort of thing that admits of some adequate, precise charac-
terization, once and for all.44 To pursue these approaches would be to evaluate whether
various candidate representations of a theory succeed. But the third approach I have dis-
cussed simply sets this idea aside. One does not need to suppose that a theory is or can be
represented by a given category in general; one merely needs to assume that for the purposes
of evaluating certain features of a proposed relationship between theories, it is valuable to
represent a theory by a category.
7. Conclusion
My goal in this paper has been to critically re-evaluate categorical equivalence as a criterion
of theoretical equivalence for physical theories. My worries turn on a prior question, of
whether a category of models can be said to adequately capture the structure of a (mathe-
matical) theory. I have argued that the answer to this question is “no”, at least in the general
case, which then leads to a number of further questions. One such question is whether one
can express, as a precise condition on a category, a necessary or sufficient condition for that
category to encode the internal structure of its objects. Another question is where we should
go from here, supposing that one accepts my arguments. On this latter question, I offer three
possible paths, each of which, I think, is suggested by work already in the literature, and I
discuss some advantages and disadvantages of each.
I will conclude with two remarks. One is just to clarify that the possible paths forward
44Defenders of these approaches might well balk at this point. Do they really need to be committed to
the view that categories of models are representations of theories “once and for all”? But if the goal is
to determine if two theories are equivalent as theories, then presumably that condition needs to capture
everything salient about the pairs of theories. If the goal is to offer a weaker notion of equivalence then
much more needs to be said about what features the standard establishes equivalence with regards to. This
is what empirical equivalence offered: equivalence with regard to the predictions made by two theories,
without implying “full” equivalence. One possible line, here, would be to say that categorical equivalence
and its various elaborations are attempting to capture a kind of “structural equivalence”, though I think
more needs to be said about just what that means.
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that I propose are not mutually exclusive, or, likely, exhaustive. Indeed, I think all three
should be pursued, and that the fruits of each will bear on the others.45 That said, as I have
argued in the last section, these proposals seem to turn on different conceptions of what
the purpose of introducing a category of models of a physical theory is meant to be, and so
some care will be needed in future work to keep these different goals clearly in sight. The
second remark is that I wish to emphasize the tentative nature of the arguments here. I
am expressing worries—not proving theorems or even defending particular views. From one
perspective, this may make the paper seem unsatisfying or unclear. I am sympathetic. But
I think the real issue, which I have tried to bring forward here, is that a program that has
received considerable attention in recent years remains underspecified and inchoate, and it
is my hope that the considerations raised here help move the project forward.
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